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ABSTRACT
With the boom of the industry of private military and security service
provision after the end of the Cold War and the emergence of various
transnational private regulatory initiatives, many questions have been
posed with regard to the application of international law to these entities
and the usefulness of transnational private regulation in ensuring their
compliance with human rights. As there is no established tradition of this
type of regulation in the given sector, it might be instructive to analyze
the effectiveness of two main multi-stakeholder regimes: the Voluntary
Principles on Security and Human Rights and the International Code of
* Evgeni Moyakine has been working as a doctoral candidate and researcher at the Department of
European and International Public Law of Tilburg University, The Netherlands, and conducting a PhD research
on the issue of State responsibility for the unlawful conduct of private military and security contractors violating
international law. He successfully defended his PhD thesis in November 2014 and obtained a doctor’s degree;
See EVGENI MOYAKINE, THE PRIVATIZED ART OF WAR: PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES AND
STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR UNLAWFUL CONDUCT IN CONFLICT AREAS (2015).
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Conduct for Private Security Service Providers. While the Voluntary
Principles provide guidance for extractive companies as clients of
private military and security contractors, the International Code of
Conduct is specifically aimed at regulating the conduct of these
contractors regarding their human rights performance and respect of
international humanitarian law. In order to make informed conclusions
regarding the effectiveness of both regimes, the examination is based on
the insights into such dimensions as legitimacy, enforcement and quality.
By evaluating the architecture, functioning and major successes and
failures of both regulatory frameworks and analyzing four abovementioned elements, this article investigates how important the
initiatives are for tackling the main issues of the industry associated with
the commission of human rights abuses by their representatives.
[I]n the absence of a strong public law answer to the challenges posed
by transnational activities to regulation, transnational private regulation
offers a tool that should not simply be dismissed as ineffective and
therefore inadequate.
1
—Nicola Jägers
I. INTRODUCTION
For more than two decades, a trend towards privatization of military affairs
and security has been a global phenomenon involving the increasingly extensive
use of private military and security companies (hereinafter: PMSCs) by a wide
spectrum of clients ranging from States to international organizations, NGOs, and
2
corporations. When information about human rights abuses committed at the
Abu Ghraib detention facility in Iraq was released in 2004, it came to the fore
that some employees of PMSCs hired by the U.S. government were implicated in
3
these violations. The reached settlement in the case only indicates that actual
perpetrators implicated in the commission of most serious crimes often escape
4
any responsibility. Therefore, there is a definite need to regulate the industry of
private military and security service provision on both national and international
levels. A possible Convention on Private Military and Security Companies is
5
being drafted by the United Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries.

1. Nicola Jägers, Regulating the Private Security Industry: Connecting the Public and the Private
Through Transnational Private Regulation, 6 HUM. RTS. & INT’L LEGAL DISCOURSE 56, 91 (2012).
2. Id. at 59.
3. Brent Kendall, Contractor’s Torture Settlement a Milestone, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324442304578232070457319286.
4. See id.
5. National Regulatory Frameworks on PMSCs, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.
ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Mercenaries/WGMercenaries/Pages/NationalRegulatoryFrameworks.aspx (last visited
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Among other States, some forms of domestic regulation of the industry are to be
traced in the national laws of the United States, the United Kingdom, and South
6
Africa, but the question of their effectiveness remains open. Against this
backdrop, it is argued that the third type of regulatory mechanisms in form of
transnational private regulation can be seen as a significant tool in the regulatory
toolbox that is capable of regulating PMSCs and ensuring their compliance with
7
human rights standards.
The current contribution builds upon the results of the case study of the
Center for Transboundary Legal Development (hereinafter: CTLD) of Tilburg
University carried out within the framework of the collaborative research project
on transnational private regulatory regimes (hereinafter: TPRERs) funded by the
8
Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law (hereinafter: HiiL). It seeks to
critically analyze two main hybrid regimes established in the field—the
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (hereinafter: VPs) and the
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers
9
(hereinafter: ICoC)—from the point of view of their effectiveness. The
examination is based on three particular dimensions—legitimacy, enforcement,
10
and quality—that are crucial for the effectiveness of TPRERs. Due to the lack
of information, specific nature of the sectors, and constant development of the
concerned initiatives, it is impossible to make credible conclusions regarding the
element of effectiveness, which is influenced by three above-mentioned
dimensions and will be assessed in rather general terms. Firstly, this article
describes two hybrid regimes and provides necessary background information on
11
their functioning and governance structures. Secondly, the article examines the
three elements of legitimacy, quality, and enforcement in order to evaluate the
12
fourth main dimension of effectiveness. Finally, the article makes a number of
conclusions regarding the VPs and the ICoC, the degree of their effectiveness
13
and its possible enhancement.

Mar. 7, 2015) (listing national legislation of some States focusing on PMSCs that the Working Group has
surveyed).
6. Id.
7. CENTER FOR TRANSBOUNDARY LEGAL DEVELOPMENT (CTLD), CASE STUDY FOR THE HAGUE
INSTITUTE FOR THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF LAW: TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATION, PRIVATE
SECURITY COMPANIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: PROMISE OF EFFECTIVENESS? 39 (2012) [hereinafter CTLD].
8. Id.; Details on the case study and broader research project see also Transnational Private Regulation:
Constitutional Foundations and Governance Design, HIIL, http://www.hiil.org/privateregulation (last visited
Mar. 7, 2015).
9. CTLD, supra note 7, at 11-14, 27.
10. See id. at 8-9 (explaining the theoretical framework of the HiiL research project).
11. See id.
12. Id. at 11-13, 20.
13. Id. at 15.
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II. REGIMES UNDER CONSIDERATION
A. Hybrid Regimes
There are a number of TPRERs aimed at regulating the conduct of PMSCs
14
and their employees. In addition to trade associations, such as the International
Stability Operations Association (hereinafter: ISOA) and the British Association
of Private Security Companies (hereinafter: BAPSC) established on the soil of
the United States and the United Kingdom, there are hybrid regimes also
15
involving a variety of stakeholders other than PMSCs. In contrast to the trade
associations safeguarding interests of their members and promoting some general
standards, the hybrid schemes serve as an arrangement for regulating the industry
and participating in a constructive dialogue on the incorporation of international
humanitarian law and human rights norms and principles into specific
16
commitments for companies. These TPRERs arguably constitute a promising
regulatory instrument in terms of their effectiveness and are elaborated upon
17
below.
B. The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
As the oldest initiative tackling human rights concerns arising from the field
of security, the VPs were convened and directed by the U.S. and U.K.
governments in 2000 in order to deal with human rights issues associated with
18
the extraction industry. The VPs only indirectly address PMSCs and specifically
19
focus on the corporate clients of PMSCs from this sector. Its membership
consists of representatives of three particular pillars: the government pillar, the
NGO pillar, and the corporate pillar respectively including nine States, 10 NGOs,
20
and 25 companies. The governance structures of the regime are comprised of
21
four bodies. The Plenary is the main decision-making body of the initiative

14. Id. at 102.
15. CTLD, supra note 7, at 50-51.
16. Id. at 59.
17. Id. at 81; see also infra Part III.
18. What are the Voluntary Principles, VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON SECURITY + HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/what-are-the-voluntary-principles/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2015); The Initiative
of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights: Governance Rules, § I, (Mar. 29, 2012),
http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/VPs_Governance_Rules_-_as_posted_June_
2014.pdf [hereinafter VPs].
19. See generally VPs, supra note 18.
20. The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights Fact Sheet, VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON
SECURITY + HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.voluntarypri
nciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/VPs_-_Fact_Sheet_-_January_2015.pdf (last visited Mar, 7,
2015) [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
21. VPs, supra note 18, at SEC. III ¶ 1(a).
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22

consisting of all participants. The Steering Committee forms the main executive
23
body composed of participating entities from all three pillars. The Secretariat is
24
the administrative body of the VPs and its tasks are currently exercised by Foley
25
Hoag’s Corporate Social Responsibility practice. The Voluntary Principles
Association is an entity addressing a variety of financial and administrative needs
26
of the initiative. The VPs provide guidelines for risk assessment and relations of
27
corporations with public and private security forces. All participants need to
meet a number of criteria including the requirements of publicly promoting the
VPs, proactively implementing or assisting in the implementation of the VPs, and
at least annually communicating publicly on the efforts to implement or assist in
28
the implementation of the VPs. In general, the VPs is the first major hybrid
regime indirectly focusing on the industry of PMSCs and is often perceived as a
blueprint for other initiatives emerging in the field.
C. The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers
The ICoC is a recently developed multi-stakeholder process engaging three
29
types of stakeholders: States, NGOs, and PMSCs. The Code itself is signed by
companies while others are in a position to issue a political statement of support.
While in November 2010 only 58 PMSCs signed the Code at the Signatory
Ceremony in Geneva, currently there are 708 firms participating in the
30
initiative. The Code has been established as a result of the negotiations of
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States with a broad range of
PMSCs, international organizations, and NGOs, such as Human Rights First and
31
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. According to a
32
state official , as it has been emphasized at the Signatory Ceremony, one of the
major challenges was to bring stakeholders together and achieve a sufficiently
22. Id. at SEC. III ¶ 2(a).
23. Id. at SEC. III ¶ 2(b).
24. Id.
25. Foley Hoag LLP, CSR Practice Selected as Secretariat for Voluntary Principles on Security and
Human Rights (Jun. 19, 2014), http://www.foleyhoag.com/news-and-events/news/2010/september/csr-practiceselected-as-secretariat-for-voluntary-principles-on-security-and-human-rights.
26. VPs, supra note 18, at SEC. III ¶ 2(d).
27. Id.
28. Participation Criteria, VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON SECURITY + HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.
voluntaryprinciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/VPs_Participation_Criteria_Final_-_127000_v1_FHEDC.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2015) [hereinafter Participation Criteria].
29. INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY PROVIDERS, http://www.icoc-psp.org
(last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Anne-Marie Buzatu, Project Coordinator of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed
Forces, at the Signatory Ceremony of the Int’l Code of Conduct for Private Sec. Service Providers held in
Geneva (Nov. 9, 2010).
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high level of mutual trust. Within the initiative, the multi-stakeholder Steering
Committee of 6 to 9 members is functioning as a temporary board and is
responsible for developing the Independent Governance and Oversight
33
Mechanism (hereinafter: IGOM). Taking the bodies of international
humanitarian and human rights law as a starting point, the regime seeks to
establish standards and principles for the industry of private security service
34
providers. The corporations undertake a number of commitments relating to the
operation in accordance with the Code, applicable law, regulations and corporate
standards of business conduct, and commit to function, in a manner recognizing
and supporting the rule of law, respecting human rights standards, and protecting
35
the interests of their clientele. In addition, companies are required to take steps
for establishing and maintaining effective internal governance frameworks and
make available necessary means for addressing possible violations of national
36
law, international law, or the Code. Finally, PMSCs need to cooperate with
national and international authorities in investigations of violations of
international humanitarian law, human rights, or international and national
37
criminal law.
III. DIMENSIONS OF THE ANALYSIS
A. Legitimacy
In the case study, the aspect of legitimacy has been defined as the acceptance
that an organization has a right to govern by those it aims to govern and those on
38
whose behalf it intends to govern. It is generally accepted that the TPRERs
created in this field lack both the coercive capacity and automatic legitimacy of
39
State regulation. Nevertheless, the objectives of the regimes aimed at ensuring
respect of companies for human rights and the law of armed conflict serve as an
indication of a certain degree of legitimacy. Inclusiveness, procedural
transparency, and the regulators’ accountability form the main tools to examine
40
the aspect of legitimacy.
33. International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers at 6 ¶ 11-12 (Nov. 9, 2010),
http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONAL_CODE_OF_CONDUCT_Final_without_Company_Names.
pdf [hereinafter ICoC].
34. Id. at 3 ¶ 5.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 4 ¶ 7-8.
37. Id. at 7 ¶ 21-22.
38. Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law (HiiL), The Added Value of Private Regulation in
an Internationalized World? Towards a Model of the Legitimacy, Effectiveness, Enforcement and Quality of
Private Regulation, at 9, www.hiil.org [hereinafter HiiL].
39. Colin Scott, Regulating in Global Regimes, HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 563, 564565 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2011).
40. HiiL, supra note 38, at 9.
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Inclusiveness entails the participation of the regulated entities—PMSCs and
their clients—and beneficiaries—persons and entities affected by the conduct of
41
PMSCs and their representatives (NGOs)—in the decision-making process.
According to a state representative, although the VPs are generally well-known
42
for the active participation of various stakeholders, the degree of inclusion is
low. Only major corporations from North America and Western Europe became
part of the initiative and there is still insufficient extent of participation of States
43
and NGOs. There is strict admissibility and participation criteria for joining the
44
VPs. In contrast, the processes within the ICoC framework reflect the high level
of inclusiveness due to the involvement of not only PMSCs, but also States and
45
NGOs in the standard-setting and enforcement mechanisms. The large number
of PMSCs that signed up to the Code indicates a fairly low threshold of
becoming a signatory company, but the geographical spread of participating
46
corporations is rather limited. Most of them are from the United States and the
United Kingdom, especially those that are most actively involved in the
47
functioning of the regime.
The following components of legitimacy are procedural transparency and
accountability. Confidentiality and secrecy surrounding the operations of PMSCs
is a general feature of the industry of PMSCs and the significance of more
48
transparency and accountability is often accentuated. While the VPs’ regime
49
suffers from the lack of transparency and trust among different stakeholders, the
transparency of the ICoC is sufficiently ensured and participants seek to achieve
trust and understanding. Due to the effects PMSCs’ conduct and regulators
within the TPRERs can have on third parties, a pertinent need for accountability
50
mechanisms arise. The element of accountability of the regulators is strongly
connected to the availability of control and oversight instruments that are
accepted by the regulated and by the third parties influenced by the PMSCs’
51
activities. The internal accountability mechanisms directed at those regulated
concern the possibility of withdrawal and voting procedures within the VPs and
41. Id. at 12.
42. The author and his colleagues personally interviewed a State representative on September 21, 2011.
43. VPs, supra note 18, at SEC. III ¶ 1; Fact Sheet, supra note 20.
44. Participation Criteria, supra note 28.
45. See Fact Sheet ICoC, Processes so Far, (Jun. 19, 2014), http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/
Fact_Sheet_ICoC_November_2011.pdf.
46. Participation Criteria, supra note 28.
47. Id.; see also INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY PROVIDERS, supra note 29.
48. Kevin A. O’Brien, What Should and What Should not Be Regulated?, in FROM MERCENARIES TO
MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES, 29, 31 (Simon Chesterman & Chia
Lehnardt eds., 2007).
49. JAMES COCKAYNE ET AL., BEYOND MARKET FORCES: REGULATING THE GLOBAL SECURITY
INDUSTRY 156-157 (2009).
50. Deirdre Curtin & Linda Senden, Public Accountability of Transnational Private Regulation: Chimera
or Reality?, 38 J.L. & SOC’Y 183 (2011).
51. See id. at 169-70, 181-86.
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52

the ICoC. The external accountability toward the third parties can find
expression in a certain degree of accountability towards NGOs and other
53
stakeholders engaged in both processes.
In sum, it appears that the dimension of legitimacy is not well-articulated in
the VPs and needs further enhancement, while the ICoC seems to be an overall
54
more legitimate process.
B. Quality
This dimension is concerned with the quality of regulatory norms and is
55
dependent upon three particular factors. In the first place, precision,
56
accessibility, and practicability of the standards determine the aspect of quality.
The VPs aimed at guiding the conduct of corporations and establishing a
dialogue between stakeholders has a rather general nature and contain broad
provisions, such as the following: “companies recognize a commitment . . . to be
57
mindful of the highest applicable international standards.” As expectations are
directed at companies, this approach arguably facilitates more flexibility of the
process focused on a variety of corporations operating in different contexts and
58
meets the need of adjusting to societal changes. The ICoC distinguishes itself
from the VPs by its specific provisions relating to the conduct of PMSCs
59
including rules on the use of force, prohibition of torture, and other matters.
The following set of factors influencing the aspect of quality is comprised by
complementarity and consistency entailing the degree to which TPRERs
complement existing public legal frameworks and other TPRERs and are
consistent with them. While the VPs contain references to the vague notions of
human rights and international humanitarian law, the document also specifically
60
mentions the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Code of Conduct
for Law Enforcement Officials, the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and
61
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, and ILO Declaration on Fundamental
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

CTLD, supra note 7, at 12.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 63-64, 78.
Id. at 12.
Id.
VPs, supra note 18, at Appendix 1, A-1.
TINEKE E. LAMBOOIJ, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: LEGAL AND SEMI-LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
SUPPORTING CSR: DEVELOPMENTS 2000-2010 AND CASE STUDIES 252 (2010).
59. Compare ICoC, supra note 33, at 8-11 ¶ 28-43 (listing specific principles regarding the conduct of
personnel, including rules for general conduct, rules for the use of force, rules for detention, rules for
apprehending persons, and prohibitions of torture or other cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment)
with Foley Hoag LLP, supra note 25.
60. Introduction and Interactions Between Companies and Private Security, VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES ON
SECURITY + HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/what-are-the-voluntary-principles (last visited
Mar. 7, 2015).
61. Id. at 4-5.
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62

Principles and Rights at Work. The ICoC also refers not only to the UN Basic
63
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, but
also the Montreux Document and the UN “Protect, Respect, and Remedy”
64
framework. Both codes of conduct, however, do not include references to other
65
TPRERs established in this particular field or other sectors.
With regard to the dimension of quality, it can be observed that on the one
hand the ICoC is to be perceived as initiative making a relatively strong claim of
being a high quality TPRER, certainly considering precision and accessibility of
its provisions, and complementarity and consistency with international norms and
standards. On the other hand, the quality of the VPs lags behind.
C. Enforcement
It is obvious that the guidelines laid down in the codes of conduct need to be
enforced in order to have effect on those regulated by the TPRERs. Some go as
far as to assert that effective regulation must be in place in order for the TPRERs
66
to even be perceived as a form of regulation. Enforcement comprises all
possible activities aimed at ensuring compliance of regulated entities with
67
regulatory norms. It implies not only ex post enforcement mechanisms, such as
remedies and sanctions, but also ex ante instruments in form of monitoring and
68
supervision. TPRERs established in the field of private security service
provision are largely at the stage of standard setting and implementation and lack
effective enforcement instruments, which is a feature common to many
69
TPRERs.
The VPs have ex ante enforcement instruments in form of an obligation to
70
publicly report on the implementation steps taken by the participants. Failure to
71
comply with this obligation can render the participants’ status inactive. In
addition, in cooperation with States, the member companies are encouraged to
participate in in-country processes in order to integrate the VPs into the local

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
ICoC, supra note 33, at arts. 32, 59(c).
Id. at Preamble, arts. 2-3.
See id.; Foley Hoag LLP, supra note 25.
Colin Scott, Non-judicial Enforcement of Transnational Private Regulation, ENFORCEMENT OF
TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION: ENSURING COMPLIANCE IN A GLOBAL WORLD147, 151 (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed.,
2012).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Fabrizio Cafaggi, Introduction: The Transformation of Transnational Private Regulation:
Enforcement Gaps and Governance Design, in ENFORCEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION: ENSURING
COMPLIANCE IN A GLOBAL WORLD1, 6147, 147-150, (Fabrizio Cafaggi ed. 2012).
70. Participation Criteria, supra note 28, at 1-2.
71. Id. at 2.

217

2015 / From National and International Frustration to Transnational Triumph?
72

practices of host counties and promote a dialogue among different stakeholders.
Participants also have a possibility to file complaints with the dispute resolution
mechanism regarding the non-compliance of each other with the duty to
73
implement the VPs. As a result, non-complying participants can be expelled
74
from the initiative with the unanimous decision.
As to the ICoC, at the drafting conference that took place in Montreux on
February 19-22, 2013 PMSCs, national governments and civil society
organizations reached an agreement on the final text of the charter of the IGOM,
75
the so-called Articles of Association. According to a state representative, on
September 19-20, 2013, the initiative launched in Geneva the International Code
of Conduct Association (hereinafter: ICoCA) that could potentially form an
effective governance and oversight mechanism without which the Code itself
76
would be a dry and meaningless document. In addition to national courts and
public forums of civil society organizations, the IGOM offers the third platform
77
for holding private military and security corporations accountable. The nonprofit Association is created as a multi-stakeholder initiative and constitutes an
78
independent legal entity with legal capacity under Swiss law. It is aimed at not
only promoting, governing, and overseeing implementation of the ICoC, but also
promoting “the responsible provision of security services and respect for human
79
rights and national and international law in accordance with the Code.” The
Association is responsible for monitoring, reporting and assessing the
80
81
participants’ performance and maintaining a third party complaints process.
The members of the Association are divided into three stakeholder pillars: private
security companies and private security service providers; governments, and civil
82
society organizations. As of June 2014, 162 private corporations have joined the
83
ICoCA. In addition, six States, including Australia, Norway, Sweden,

72. See id. at 1, 3.
73. VPs, supra note 18, at 31-32.
74. Participation Criteria, supra note 28, at 3.
75. See Eidgenossisches Department Fur auswartige Angelegenheiten, SWISS CONFEDERATION (Jun. 19,
2014), http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/recent/media/single.html?id=47889.
76. The author and his colleagues personally interviewed a State representative. This information was
obtained from that interview. As stressed by Andrew Clapham in the panel discussion that took place at the
Signatory Ceremony of the ICoC held in Geneva on Nov. 9, 2010.
77. The author and his colleagues personally interviewed a State representative. This information was
obtained from that interview.
78. ICoC, Articles of Association, art. 1.1, http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/ICoC_Articles_of_
Association.pdf [hereinafter ICoC Articles].
79. ICoC Articles, art. 2.2.
80. Id. at art. 12.
81. Id. at art. 13.
82. Id. at art. 3.1.
83. International Code of Conduct Association, Members of the ICoC Association: Private Security
Service Providers (Jun. 19, 2014), http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/international_regulation/global_
standards_codes_of_conduct/icoca-member-companies_june-2014.pdf [hereinafter ICoCA].
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Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, belong to the members
84
of the Association. Among the participants, one can also find 13 civil society
85
organizations, such as the Human Rights Watch and One Earth Future. The
main bodies of the ICoCA are the General Assembly, the Board of Directors, and
86
the Secretariat. The General Assembly is the governing body of the Association
comprising all participants that provides a venue for voting on different matters
87
and engaging in a multi-stakeholder dialogue and discussion. The Board of
Directors functions as the executive decision-making organ composed of twelve
88
Directors with four seats for every pillar. At the moment, the Board is in the
process of developing procedures for company certification and monitoring and
89
for the complaints mechanism. The Secretariat supervised by an Executive
Director has as its core task the execution of the decisions of the Board and
90
maintaining records required for the governance of the Association. In addition,
there is also an Advisory Forum of Montreux Document Participants serving as a
resource for the Board of Directors and giving advice to the ICoCA concerning
91
national and international policy and regulatory matters.
Next to the use of ex ante and ex post enforcement mechanisms, an
alternative means of enforcement should be distinguished in which the clientele
92
of PMSCs can play a crucial role. As observed by Doug Brooks, the founder of
ISOA and now President Emeritus of this association, “standards never change
93
unless the client pays attention to the standards.” Therefore, of particular
importance is the concept of the so-called redeployment purporting that initially
voluntary guidelines, such as those included in codes of conduct, acquire a
certain degree of legal bindingness when they are incorporated into the contracts
94
concluded between PMSCs and their clients or are used as benchmarks. In this
regard, voluntary commitments function as legal norms when several gatekeepers
contracting PMSCs require companies to comply with a code of conduct. Over
time, such instruments of private regulation obtain a compulsory status and can
84. ICoCA, Members of the ICoC Association: States (Jun. 19, 2014), http://www.icoca.ch/assets/icocamember-states_january-20142.pdf.
85. Id.
86. ICoC Articles, supra note 78, at art. 5.1.
87. Id. at art. 6.
88. Id. at arts. 7.1-7.2.
89. Minutes from the ICoC Steering Committee Meeting in London (Sep. 26-28, 2011) at 2.
90. ICoC Articles, supra note 78, at art. 9.1, 9.3.
91. Id. at art. 10.1.
92. WORLD BANK GROUP MANAGEMENT RESPONSE, STRIKING A BETTER BALANCE – THE WORLD BANK
GROUP AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES REVIEW §3.20,
3.21 (2004) [hereinafter WORLD BANK GROUP MANAGEMENT RESPONSE].
93. Whitney Grespin, An Act of Faith: Building the International Code of Conduct for Private Security
Providers, THE DIPLOMATIC COURIER, Jul. 19, 2012, available at http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/
topics/security/1233-an-act-of-faith-building-the-international-code-of-conduct-for-private-security-providers
(last accessed Mar. 8, 2015).
94. Curtin & Senden, supra note 50, at 168.

219

2015 / From National and International Frustration to Transnational Triumph?
be regarded as being legally binding to a greater extent than international
95
conventions having their own limitations. In this process, States appear to play
the crucial role by including the guidelines of codes of conduct in the public
procurement policies and taking an active stance in the establishment and
96
development of TPRERs. The VPs—often criticized for the lack of active State
97
support —experienced a surge in development after the involvement of the U.S.
98
government. Some investors also already take the VPs as a benchmark while
financing certain projects: the World Bank requires, for instance, the extractive
99
projects under its support to be compatible with the Code. The VPs specifically
provide that, where it is appropriate, companies should include the outlined
100
standards in the contractual agreements with private security providers. The
ICoC also contains a requirement for signatory companies to make compliance
with the Code an integral part of contracts with subcontractors, personnel and
101
other parties performing security services under these contractual agreements.
While the results of the empirical study indicate that various companies
participating in the ICoC comply with it, there are corporations lacking any
102
knowledge or understanding of this redeployment provision. In addition to the
references to the VPs and the ICoC in contracts and their use as benchmarks, the
adherence of PMSCs to the TPRERs can be made compulsory by clients or
103
insurers. For example, PMSCs willing to be hired by the US in Afghanistan
104
were required to become members of the ISOA in order to win a contract.
The current state of affairs makes clear that the aspect of enforcement is
rather under-developed in both regimes. The ICoCA, however, constitutes a
potentially strong enforcement mechanism capable of ensuring compliance of
PMSCs with the standards of the code. In this regard, the main clients of these
corporations and other possible gatekeepers need to be actively involved in the
105
functioning of the instrument and redeployment of the standards in question.

95. Jägers, supra at note 1, at 85.
96. Id. at 86-87.
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101. ICoC, supra note 33, at ¶ 18.
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with stakeholder (Sep. 8, 2011).
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105. See supra Part C.

220

Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 28
D. Effectiveness
The element of effectiveness has been identified as the extent to which
106
TPRERs under analysis meet their own objectives. It is influenced by not only
legitimacy and quality of the regulatory processes, but also enforcement
107
instruments established by the given regimes. A distinction is made between
108
two particular dimensions of effectiveness: formal and substantive. Formal
effectiveness is concerned with the process of measuring compliance with the
109
rules of TPRERs.
Substantive effectiveness is measured against the
110
achievement of regulatory objectives of the initiatives. It implies that regulatory
objectives and regulatory instruments to achieve them are clear and well111
defined.
From the perspective of regulatory relationships, the concept of effectiveness
is not only capable of measuring compliance of regulated parties with the norms
of a regime, but is also concerned with the effects of the regulatory process on
112
the beneficiaries of the regulation. Examined from the angle of institutional
complementarity, effectiveness of transnational private regulation appears to
depend on the credibility and legitimacy of public institutions, such as the
113
judicial bodies on the national and international levels. When hybrid regimes
emerge that include both public and private actors, it increases effectiveness due
114
to the fact that various stakeholders participate in the process of rule-making.
Effectiveness of such initiatives must be assessed in terms of possibilities to
ensure that private law-making achieves its promised goals and the question what
115
principles must be used to implement consistency between means and ends.
The degree of effectiveness, just as legitimacy, depends on different relationships
of recognition that TPRERs enter into with their surroundings: for instance,
interaction with and connection to other normative orders, such as state legal
116
systems and other TPRERs. It is, however, also true that in practice there might
be a difference between the effectiveness as perceived by the members of a
106. CTLD, supra note 7, at 14.
107. Id.
108. Fabrizio Cafaggi, Clarifying the Definitions, Internal Guidance Document, HiiL Research Project, 3-4.
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TPRER and the ability of a regime to meet its own regulatory objectives. In the
final analysis, the effectiveness of private rule-making necessarily entails the
question “to what extent the rules as drafted and implemented have been able to
118
achieve the expected and declared regulatory objectives.”
Before going into the substance of the analysis of effectiveness of the VPs
and the ICoC, the specific nature of this particular industry and the environment
of the operation of its representatives need to be stressed. The industry of PMSCs
is familiar with many rogue corporations that appear, disappear and reappear
again under a different name in a different location when governments seek to
regulate their activities or human rights are violated and the companies’ image
119
sustains damage. Such was the situation in South Africa after the adoption of
the South African Foreign and Military Assistance Act in 1998 banning all
120
mercenary activity. When the act was passed, many private security firms
decided to reconstitute themselves, relocate to other States or enter the illegal
121
market beyond the influence of government. Similar practices within the
industry characterized by a high level of secrecy undoubtedly have a negative
impact on the legitimacy of the industry and undermine effective attempts to
122
regulate the compliance of its representatives with human rights. In addition,
PMSCs are often to be found in conflict areas with the absence of the rule of law,
123
which makes the effective implementation of TPRERs nearly impossible.
A number of evaluation points should be taken into account in the
assessment of effectiveness: industry commitment and capacity, private interests
as a driving force behind establishing TPRERs, government pressure and
oversight, availability of credible sanctioning policies and means to render this
124
type of regulation effective, such as design indicators and impact indicators. In
the HiiL case study, design indicators were seen as means and mechanisms
making regulation effective, while impact indicators were understood as the
perception of effectiveness by regulated parties and third parties, since it was
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deemed not possible to measure the actual impact of the TPRERs within the
125
scope of the research.
The initiative of the VPs seeking to regulate the conduct of extractive
companies and indirectly influencing PMSCs has experienced little commitment
126
from the industry towards the achievement of the regime’s objectives.
According to an NGO representative, merely a small number of corporations
have become part of the initiative and comply with the Code as long as there is
127
an added value of doing so. The companies are largely driven by the main
desire to improve the overall image of the industry and individual companies and
128
secure contract possibilities. These reputational concerns and commercial
considerations appear to be in line with the core aim of the VPs to ensure
protection of human rights of the local population in the areas where companies
129
operate. As a primary matter of concern, a general lack of governmental
130
pressure was indicated in the qualitative empirical research. Enforcement and
131
oversight instruments are considered rather weak and underdeveloped.
Sanctioning policies available to the process are also ineffective and are based on
132
the possibility of expelling a participant or declaring its status inactive. Design
indicators of the VPs are constituted in the first instance by the set of
performance indicators for member companies developed by the participating
133
NGO International Alert. In addition, there is a reporting requirement,
according to which every participant has to report to the Plenary regarding its
134
efforts to implement the VPs. According to a State representative, in general,
stakeholders and third parties do not perceive the VPs to constitute an effective
135
process and often criticize it for lacking teeth and being ineffective. Due to the
low levels of legitimacy, quality and enforcement, the effectiveness of the VPs
remains very limited.
Currently, the ICoC initiative is making significant steps towards the
regulation of the PMSCs’ industry: the ICoCA has recently been launched and it
125. CTLD, supra note 7, at 72.
126. Interview with NGO representative (Jan. 7, 2010).
127. Interview with NGO representative (Jan. 7, 2010).
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might be too early to speak of the effectiveness of the regime as a whole. A
number of general observations, however, are in order. It is obvious that there is
a fairly high degree of industry commitment and support of States and trade
137
organizations for the ICoC. As the main reason for the PMSCs to become
signatory parties to the regime reputational concerns and more competitiveness
on the market have frequently been articulated, and it perfectly aligns with the
138
aims of the initiative. Upon its establishment, the Association aims at ensuring
monitoring, reporting and assessment of the participants’ performance and
139
operating a third party complaints process. In sum, the ICoC potentially holds
the strongest promise for effectiveness due to its level of legitimacy, quality of
the norms and standards and, most importantly, its elaborate governance and
140
oversight mechanism substantially improving the dimension of enforcement.
IV. CONCLUSION
Two hybrid rights-based transnational private regulatory frameworks directly
or indirectly focusing on PMSCs constitute a reaction to numerous corporate
141
human rights violations that should not be underestimated. These regimes
remain, without doubt, voluntary initiatives in which firms can participate or
abstain from any involvement, but voluntary in a strict legal sense they acquire a
degree of binding authority from not only the social and economic points of
142
view , but also from the legal perspective in case of re-deployment.
Considering the effectiveness of the VPs and the ICoC, it follows that the
absence of effective oversight and enforcement mechanisms ensuring
implementation of the codes and respect of the standards by the participants
143
severely diminishes the capacity of the TPRERs to achieve their objectives. It
is evident that the lack of credible and effective enforcement mechanisms
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common to transnational private regulation in general makes them ineffective.
In this regard, the ICoC will potentially serve as an example of the initiative
capable of establishing and maintaining an effective enforcement process and be
significantly more effective than its predecessors. In the same vein, the ICoC as a
self-regulatory framework involving PMSCs that undertake to participate in the
process and comply with the standards concerned has the advantage of directly
addressing these business entities and surpassing limitations and weaknesses of
145
international law. It is also clear that effectiveness of both the VPs and the
ICoC is to a great degree dependent upon the active participation and support of
States and other stakeholders, such as clients, insurance companies and NGOs
146
playing a central role of gatekeepers. It might be apparent, however, that to
engage more stakeholders and encourage them to function as such, a higher level
of transparency of the processes is necessary.
Currently, there is a long way to go for the ICoC and especially the VPs to
become more effective. Obviously, the industry of PMSCs with its peculiarities
and challenges can hardly be regulated by the TPRERs alone: what is needed is a
147
balanced exercise of creating a smart mix of measures of international, national
148
and transnational character. Only this method of using a variety of regulatory
instruments will prove to be undeniably effective in achieving the ultimate goal
of ensuring compliance of PMSCs with human rights.
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